Legal originality. by Siems,  Mathias
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 August 2011
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Siems, Mathias (2008) ’Legal originality.’, Oxford journal of legal studies., 28 (1). pp. 147-164.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqm024
Publisher’s copyright statement:
This is a pre-copy-editing author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Oxford journal of legal studies
following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Siems, Mathias (2008) ’Legal originality.’, Oxford
journal of legal studies., 28 (1). pp. 147-164 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqm024
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Legal Originality 
 
Mathias M. Siems
*
 
 
Final version published in  
(2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147-164 
 
 
Abstract:  In legal academia it is highly controversial how to „be original‟ in legal 
research. This article will try to maintain an attitude of tolerance in not promoting or 
discrediting one particular methodology. Instead, it will identify four different ways of 
„being original‟. Perhaps the most common approach is to deal with „micro-legal 
questions‟. Many legal academics also pursue research in „macro-legal questions‟. 
Less common but growing is the importance of „scientific legal research‟ and research 
in „non-legal topics‟.  
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 1 
It is better to fail in originality, than to succeed in imitation 
(Herman Melville)
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For outsiders it is often difficult to understand what the role of academic lawyers is. 
This is different from other academic fields. It is easier to imagine the tasks of aca-
demic physicians, archaeologists or philosophers, namely, finding cures for diseases, 
excavating ancient artefacts, and answering the question of the meaning of life. With 
academic lawyers the problem is not, however, that outsiders do not understand ex-
actly what „the law‟ is, because people usually can imagine what judges and solicitors 
are doing. Rather it is not obvious how to pursue a specific academic approach to law. 
So, what exactly are the tasks of law professors and lecturers?  
On the one hand, they have to prepare students for legal practice. This involves 
teaching them to find answers to problems posed by future clients. On the other hand, 
legal academics have to pursue academic legal research. This research has to go be-
yond the mere solving of practical legal problems. A practical problem can be the 
starting point for academic legal research. However, for a truly academic piece there 
has to be some original idea how law is to be understood or applied. Still, this may 
make the outsider question how exactly this kind of „legal originality‟ can be 
achieved? 
In legal academia this issue is, of course, highly controversial. In particular, the 
discussion between „traditionalists‟, who are mainly interested in a thorough under-
                                                 
1
 H. Melville, „Hawthorne and His Mosses‟, The Literary World, August 17 and 24, 1850, also avail-
able at http://www.ibiblio.org/eldritch/nh/hahm.html. 
 2 
standing of the law, and „contextualists‟, who think that is not enough, can stir many 
emotions.
2
 This is hardly surprising, since this debate concerns the very nature of how 
the research of legal academics is assessed. This is still the case today. Although an 
empirical study on British legal academics has found that there is a move away from 
traditional doctrinal analysis towards a more contextual, interdisciplinary approach,
3
 
the same study also states that the engagement in socio-legal studies is often rather 
limited and that law is not yet strongly interdisciplinary.
4
 
This article is part of this discussion. It identifies four ways of „being original‟ in 
legal research. Perhaps the most common approach is to deal with „micro-legal ques-
tions‟. Many legal academics also pursue research in „macro-legal questions‟. Less 
common but growing is the importance of „scientific legal research‟ and research in 
„non-legal topics‟.  
Despite the ambition of this article to identify „good research‟ its attitude is one of 
tolerance. It does not try to promote a particular way or method of legal research. The 
four different approaches (and their various sub-cases) cover both traditional and con-
textual research. They also address both positive and normative aspect of legal re-
search. Thus, this article advocates that legal academics have choice and that ranking 
                                                 
2
 Similar D. L. Rhode, „Legal Scholarship‟ (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327-1361 at 1327 („Most legal 
academics should approach scholarship on legal scholarship with considerable wariness. It is difficult 
to engage in serious criticism without offending at least some valued colleagues, and appearing arro-
gant, hypocritical, or both.‟). 
3
 F Cownie, Legal Academics (Oxford: Hart, 2004) at 72, 197.  
4
 Cownie, above n 3 at 56-57, 198. See also Dame H. Genn, M. Partington and S. Wheeler, Law in the 
Real World: Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works: Final Report and Recommendation 
(London: Nuffield Foundation, 2006) at 26 (UK law schools dominated by theoretical and text-based 
research).  
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different methodologies
5
 should be avoided. Academics can also be „foxes‟ or 
„hedgehogs‟. A fox is said to know many things but a hedgehog knows one big thing.6 
Therefore, it is equally valuable either to employ a variety of methods or to focus on 
one of them.  
 
2. ‘Micro-legal questions’ 
 
The term „micro-legal questions‟ describes research that analyses a specific legal 
problem, such as a specific provision of a statute or code, or a specific case or line of 
cases. However, in order to achieve originality there has to be more than a mere sum-
mary of the statutory provisions or the line of cases. It is also not enough that the way 
in which legal information is presented is particularly skilful.
7
 Rather it is necessary 
that something new is suggested. Examples may include a new solution to a particular 
legal problem, a new way to interpret a particular statutory provision or court decision 
or a new way to evaluate a particular legal rule. 
The initial step to achieve this is to examine the micro-legal question in some de-
tail. An analysis of a particular statutory provision would discuss its wording and leg-
                                                 
5
 See e.g. J. B. Ruhl, „The Hierarchy of Legal Scholarship‟, September 21, 2006, available at 
http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/09/hierarchy-of-legal-scholarship.html: 0 points: Blog posts; 
1 point: Publication of what are essentially blog posts with footnotes; 2 points: Doctrinal review of the 
state of the law; 3 points: Doctrinal study of interesting questions of law; 4 points: Doctrinal synthesis 
of developments in law; 5 points: Normative policy analysis of law; 6 points: Normative policy analy-
sis of law with substantial reform proposals; 7 points: Legal theory; 8 points: „Law and‟ interdiscipli-
nary studies; 9 points: Empirical study of legal institutions; 10 points: Empirical study of law‟s impact 
on society. 
6
 Sir I. Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953) quoting Archilochus. 
7
 For a different view see P. C. Kissam, „The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship‟ (1998) 63 Wash. L. Rev. 
221-255 at 228 (original dissemination of existing knowledge can satisfy „a broadly conceived standard 
of originality‟). 
 4 
islative purpose. An analysis of a particular court decision may distinguish between 
the facts, ruling and obiter dicta as well as discussing the decision‟s relationship to 
previous case law. Given the complexity of law these analyses may not be easy. How-
ever, they are usually not particularly „original‟. Something more is necessary. 
First, this „something more‟ can derive from the aim for coherence and integrity of 
the law. Thus, at least for hermeneutic purposes, many academics adopt an internal 
point of view in order to see how different elements of the law fit together.
8
 Different 
terms are used for this approach. Some call this an „interpretive legal theory‟ which 
aims at „identifying connections between features of the law‟ and „illuminating the 
law‟s fundamental structure‟.9 A similar term is „legal synthesis‟ which attempts „to 
fuse the disparate elements of cases and statutes together into coherent or useful legal 
standards or general rules‟.10 Civil-law traditions regard it as a challenging academic 
task to examine whether different rules which display common characteristics form an 
„inner system‟.11 
The theoretical background of this reasoning is that law is not simply the accumu-
lation of data. For instance, Neil MacCormick emphasises the role that consistency 
and coherence play in legal reasoning. Consistency just means non-contradiction, 
whereas coherence refers to „a set of propositions which, taken together, “makes 
                                                 
8
 See C. McCrudden, „Legal Research and Social Sciences‟, (2006) 122 LQR 632-650 at 634. 
9
 See A. Beever and C. Rickett, „Interpretive Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer, Review of Wad-
dams, Dimensions of Private Law‟ (2005) 68 MLR 320-337.  
10
 Kissam, above n 7 at 232-3.   
11
 For the term „inner system‟ see, e.g., C.-W. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Juris-
prudenz (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983) at 19; F. Bydlinski, System und Prinzipien des Priva-
trechts (Wien: Springer, 1996) at 4; P. Heck, Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz (Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1932) at 139-43. For a summary in English see G. A. Weiss, „The Enchantment of Codification 
in the Common-Law World‟ (2000) 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 435-532 at 464. 
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sense” in its entirety‟,12 and which may justify arguments by analogy. According to 
Ronald Dworkin we should „treat our system of public standards as expressing and 
respecting a coherent set of principles‟,13 possibly even leading to the law as a „seam-
less web‟.14 Based on this interpretive ideal of integrity legal solutions have to be 
constructed in a way that best fits and justifies the law as a whole. Law must be 
coherent with pre-existing cases and statutes, and it must also aim for the best 
justification for the solution to a particular legal problem.
15
 
Despite this overall aim for consistency this „interpretative‟, „synthetic‟ or „sys-
temic‟ approach can lead to a positive or negative result. Examples would be legion. 
A simple example of a positive result may be establishing common principles of con-
sumer protection, if – as in most countries – consumer protection is not codified in a 
single statute or code.
16
 Alternatively, one may also demonstrate that there is internal 
incoherence because of conflicting legal norms. Thus, there may be a negative result 
where it is, for instance, shown that a particular behaviour is encouraged by company 
law but discouraged by tax law.
17
 
Secondly, legal history can be valuable. Yet, for modern laws some historical con-
siderations may also often be taken into account by legal practitioners. Practising 
                                                 
12
 N. MacCormick, Rhetoric and The Rule of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2005) at 189, 190, 206; N. MacCor-
mick, Legal Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon: 1978) at 152, 195. 
13
 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1986) at 217. 
14
 R. Dworkin, „No Right Answer?‟ in Law, Morality and Society (M. S. Hacker and J. Raz eds, 
Oxford: OUP, 1977), at 84.  
15
 For more details see Dworkin, above n 13. See also S. W. Ball, „Dworkin and His Critics: The Rele-
vance of Ethical Theory in Philosophy of Law‟ (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 340-384 at 369-372 (with refer-
ence to Quine‟s view of science). 
16
 But see, e.g., the French Code de la Consommation 1978 (as amended). 
17
 For instance, there is some discussion whether the use of the European Company (SE) may be hin-
dered by tax reasons; see, e.g., European Federation of Accountants (FEE), Position Paper on Tax 
Treatment of the European Company (Societas Europaea), November 2003. 
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business lawyers who advise on financial markets may very well consider the recent 
development of the law – first the Financial Services Act 1986, then the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 – when they advise clients. However, in other cases 
legal history is far more demanding because it may involve the examination of old 
records, knowledge of ancient languages and the history of a particular time, as well 
as the ability to draw conclusions from various sources. It may also be challenging to 
discuss whether insights of legal history have persisted and can still be applied to to-
day‟s legal system.18 Thus, legal history can be a means of understanding, criticising, 
and assessing the state of the law,
19
 leading to original results. 
Thirdly, one can add „macro-legal topics‟ to a „micro-legal analysis‟ and, in doing 
so, make it original. Macro-legal topics are concerned with general concepts, prob-
lems, and principles of the law, such as, legal philosophy and legal theory.
20
 An ex-
ample of the link between a particular micro-legal and a macro-legal question is the 
principle nullum crimen sine lege. This principle of constitutional and criminal law 
means that a person can only be criminally responsible if at the time the conduct in 
question takes place it constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the court .
21
 Of 
course, it is also a topic of legal philosophy what exactly „law‟ is.22 Thus, it can be 
                                                 
18
 See e.g. F. G. Kempen, Legal History: Law and Social Change (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1963) at 5; R. A. Posner, Frontiers in Legal Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001) at 145-221. 
19
 Kempen, above n 18 at vii. 
20
 See Part 2 below. 
21
 See e.g. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 7; Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
arts. 22, 23; S. Pomorski, American Common Law and the Principle Nullum Crimen Sine Lege (The 
Hague: Mouton, 2nd edn, 1975). 
22
 See e.g. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2nd revised edn, 1997); see also J. Raz, 
The Authority of Law (Oxford, OUP, 1979) at 213-4 on the principle nullum crimen sine lege. 
 7 
fruitful to discuss to what extent these philosophical arguments may matter for an ap-
plication of the nullum crimen sine lege principle.
23
  
Fourthly, comparative law can make a micro-legal question original. When the 
laws of two or more legal systems are compared, the question often suggests itself 
why these legal systems are different and whether there is a need for harmonisation or 
convergence. Yet, one is not practising comparative law if two or more different legal 
systems are just described. Rather comparative law is about making a comparison 
and, possibly, also a policy recommendation for one or more of the countries in-
volved.
24
 Thus, comparative law can lead to original ideas because it helps lawyers to 
ask questions they would not otherwise ask about their own law.
25
 
Fifthly, other academic disciplines can enrich a micro-legal analysis. Prevalent 
other disciplines for this (limited) „law & analysis‟26 are economics, finance, sociol-
ogy, psychology, and literature.
27
 Examples would be legion. For instance, in law and 
economics there are extensive discussions about the appropriate remedies for breach 
of contract. The predominant view is that only expectation damages should be 
awarded but not specific performance and disgorgement of profits, since the latter 
                                                 
23
 See e.g. T. Mertens, „Nazism, legal positivism and Radbruch‟s thesis on statutory injustice‟ (2003) 
14 Law and Critique 277-295. 
24
 See K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 3rd edn, 1998) 
at 44-7. 
25
 E B. Rock, „America‟s Fascination with German Corporate Governance‟ (1994) Aktiengesellschaft 
291-299 at 299. On the functions of comparative law see generally, e.g., P de Cruz, Comparative Law 
in a Changing World (London: Cavendish, 3nd edn, 2007) 18-25; Zweigert and Kötz, above n 24 at 13-
31. 
26
 For other forms of interdisciplinary research see text to notes 52-121 below. 
27
 For a general overview see R. A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). 
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remedies would deter „efficient breaches of contract‟.28 Even scholars who do not be-
long to the law and economics community consider these views.
29
 Indeed, one does 
not need to be an expert or an enthusiast of interdisciplinary research to use some „law 
&‟ arguments in a micro-legal analysis.30 
Sixthly, it is possible to gain a deeper level of understanding by „connecting law to 
life‟. In some cases this type of „clinical scholarship‟31 is obvious. For instance, a 
comparative analysis of UK and Chinese company law may find that some legal rules 
are relatively similar. However, the economic and political setting of both countries is, 
of course, quite different. Thus, one can make the point that, for instance, the law on 
fiduciary duties of directors works differently in both countries due to the differences 
in shareholder structure, legal enforcement, the financial press, legal advice etc.
32
 In 
other cases a consideration of the „law in action‟ can also be interesting. Therefore, it 
may be shown that judges do not actually follow a particular rule despite constantly 
                                                 
28
 See e.g. R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (New York: Aspen, 6th edn, 2003) at 118-26. See 
also T. S. Ulen, „The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Reme-
dies‟ (1984) 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341-403; D. Friedmann, „The Efficient Breach Fallacy‟ (1989) 18 J. Leg. 
Stud. 1-24; M. Eisenberg, „Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, The Theory of Efficient Breach 
and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law‟ (2005) 93 Cal. L. Rev. 975-1050; S. Shavell, „Specific 
Performance versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis‟ (2006) 84 Tex. L. Rev. 
831-876. 
29
 Cf. A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales – Economic Insights for the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006) at 
205-6; M. M. Siems, „Disgorgement of Profits for Breach of Contract – A Comparative Analysis‟ 
(2003) 7 Edinburgh Law Review 27-59 at 51-4. 
30
 But see text to notes 52-121 below. 
31
 Term by Kissam, above n 7 at 234 („…by this I mean writing that analyzes, reflects upon, and inter-
prets legal practices as opposed to legal doctrine.‟). See also T. S. Ulen, „A Nobel Prize in Legal Sci-
ence: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method of the Study of Law‟ (2002) U. Ill. L. Rev. 
875-920 at 900-9. 
32
 See generally M. M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) at 191-3, 
228. 
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reciting it.
33
 An empirical analysis of business behaviour may lead to the conclusion 
that contractual remedies are not very important in practice because businessmen pre-
fer alternative forms of dispute settlement
34
 or because they are not even aware of the 
law in the first place.
35
 It can also be examined how public law is implemented in 
practice. For instance, research has been undertaken on the relevance of law on the 
organisational structure of prisons and special hospitals.
36
 Whilst it is true that empiri-
cal work requires more effort than conventional research,
37
 if these efforts are under-
taken it is easier to produce something original because new information is brought 
into the discussion of a particular legal problem. 
 
3. ‘Macro-legal questions’ 
 
A macro-legal analysis is concerned with general concepts, problems and principles 
of the law. It is not primarily about a specific micro-legal problem, such as a specific 
                                                 
33
 See D. Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule (Oxford: OUP, 1991) who examined 1400 
cases in order to find out whether courts had followed the „irreparable injury rule‟ of remedies. 
34
 The first and most influential piece is S. Macaulay, „Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Pre-
liminary Study‟ (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 1-19. See also D. Charny, „Nonlegal Sanc-
tions in Commercial Relationships‟ (1990) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 375-467; R. W. Gordon, „Macaulay, 
Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law‟ (1985) Wis. L. Rev. 561-579 at 
575 („contract law and commentaries inhabit academic museums of quaint curiosities bearing but slight 
resemblance to the law-in-action known to contracting parties and their lawyers.‟). 
35
 R. C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). See also R. C. Ellickson, „Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among 
Neighbors in Shasta County‟ (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623-687. 
36
 G. Richardson, Law, Process and Custody: Prisoners and Patients (London: Weidenfeld and Nichol-
son, 1993). 
37
 See Rhode, above n 2 at 1354 („Why bother with fieldwork when you can leap instantly into print by 
reading some prominent cases and commentary in the comfort of your office and saying what you 
think?‟). 
 10 
provision or case. Nevertheless, it is useful to include micro-examples in these macro-
legal analyses lest it gets too abstract (verba docent exempla trahunt
38
). Furthermore, 
the distinction between micro- and macro-analysis is not a strict one because it may 
also be possible to try to achieve both, which may be called „meso-legal analysis‟. 
Once again, by asking macro-legal questions legal originality can be achieved 
through a number of possibilities. First, this may be the case for books about an entire 
area of law (such as contract law, company law etc.). To be sure, not all of these 
books are original because sometimes they are merely compilations of cases or sum-
maries of the relevant statutory law. However, it is also possible that an author devel-
lops overriding principles and constructs an area of law in a new and coherent way. 
This type of macro-legal research is therefore an extension of the first variant of mi-
cro-legal research.
39
 The importance of such constructions which show that „the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts‟40 is beyond doubt. Despite his extensive in-
terdisciplinary writings even Richard Posner recently stated: 
„The messy work product of the judges and legislators requires a good deal of 
tidying up, of synthesis, analysis, restatement, and critique. These are intellec-
tually demanding tasks, requiring vast knowledge and the ability (not only 
brains and knowledge and judgment, but also Sitzfleisch) to organize dis-
persed, fragmentary, prolix, and rebarbative materials. These are tasks that 
lack the theoretical breadth or ambition of scholarship in more typically aca-
                                                 
38
 Which means „Words instruct, illustrations lead‟. The origins of this saying are not entirely clear but 
it is probably a modification of „longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla‟ (Seneca 
the Younger, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, Liber 1, Epistula 6 para. 5). 
39
 See text to notes 8-17 above. 
40
 E. J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 13. 
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demic fields. Yet they are of inestimable importance to the legal system and of 
greater social value than much esoteric interdisciplinary legal scholarship‟.41 
Secondly, the main interest can be about the basic terms which categorise the legal 
system such as „law‟, „justice‟, and „rights‟. These are the main topics of legal phi-
losophy and legal theory.
42
 Here, on the one hand, being original may be easier than 
in a micro-legal analysis because the academic does not face the danger that he or she 
is just doing the same – useful but unoriginal – task of a legal practitioner. On the 
other hand, an article on legal philosophy is not always original. Given the extensive 
existing literature the danger is here that one primarily describes other people‟s views. 
This review of literature can be useful. However, for legal originality some new ideas 
have to be developed.  
Thirdly, one can look at legal methods in a wide sense, which includes methods of 
interpretation, legal research and education. It can also be discussed on a general level 
whether and how insights from other academic fields can (or should) be taken into 
account in legal reasoning.
43
 An obvious example is this article itself. Furthermore, 
there are already intensive discussions about, for instance, the role of contextual and 
empirical research in legal studies
44
 and the question whether Europe should follow 
the path of the US where law and economics (still) dominates the academic land-
                                                 
41
 R. A. Posner, „In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007)‟ (2007) 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435-438 at 
437. 
42
 For instance on „law‟ see Hart, above n 22 above; on „justice‟ see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); on „rights‟ see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seri-
ously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
43
 See also text to notes 26-30 above and 52-121 below on applied interdisciplinary research. 
44
 See e.g. P. A. Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997); Posner, above n 27 at 
411-40. See also the Law in Context Series (now published by Cambridge University Press; originally 
published by Weidenfeld). 
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scape.
45
 These discussions can be original. However, it would be fruitless to attempt 
to draw up some kind of ranking since agreement on a common legal methodology is 
highly unrealistic.
46
 
Fourthly, macro-legal research can examine the increasingly international features 
of the law. This does not mean that writing about these international elements makes 
research automatically original. However, the complex international features provide 
a springboard for legal originality. For example, one can discuss the question of 
whether legal transplants „work‟ or whether they just irritate the existing legal struc-
tures.
47
 It is also challenging to analyse whether the globalisation of economies and 
cultures leads to a convergence of legal systems or whether fundamental differences 
are likely to persist.
48
 This can further be linked with the debate about regulatory 
competition as a means to put pressure on law-makers, which – possibly – leads to 
                                                 
45
 For the development in the US see U. Mattei, „The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay 
for Judge Guido Calabresi‟ (2005) 12 Maryland Law Review 220-249. For the European discussion see 
e.g. Ogus, above n 29 above; K. Dau-Schmidt and C. Brun, „Lost in Translation: The Economic Analy-
sis of Law in the United States and Europe‟ (2006) 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 602-621; R. A. Posner, 
„The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe‟ (1997) 17 International Review of Law 
and Economics 3-14; R. Van den Bergh, „The growth of law and economics in Europe‟ (1996) 40 
European Economic Review 969-977. 
46
 See text to note 2 above. 
47
 See e.g. A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens-London: Univer-
sity of Georgia Press, 2nd edn, 1993); G. Teubner, „Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law Or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Differences‟ (1993) 61 MLR 11-32; P. Legrand, „The Impossibility of 
Legal Transplants‟ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111-124. 
48
 B. S. Markesinis, The Gradual Convergence (Oxford: OUP, 1994); P. Legrand, „European Legal 
Systems Are Not Converging‟ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52-81; N. H. 
D. Foster, „The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Scholarly Recourse‟ (2006) 1 Journal of Com-
parative Law 1-11. For the company-law literature see e.g. J. N. Gordon and M. J. Roe (eds) Conver-
gence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); Siems, above n 32. 
 13 
convergence.
49
 Another example may be research which is based on the consideration 
that „state-based law in the traditional sense becomes a component in a complex net-
work of national, transnational and international private and public norms‟.50 Thus, it 
is interesting and important to understand how, in this new „multi-level-governance‟, 
different types of regulation are interrelated.
51
 
Fifthly, the relationship between law and politics can stimulate original thoughts. 
On a formal level, this concerns the debate about whether a particular type of law is 
preferable. For example, one can evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of case 
law and statutory law, general clauses and detailed rules, mandatory law and default 
rules, hard law and soft law, as well as (other) innovative regulatory philosophies.
52
 
With respect to legal enforcement it can furthermore be discussed whether it is more 
„efficient‟ (however defined) to enforce law by means of private, administrative, or 
criminal law.
53
 On a substantive level, one can examine which general policy concep-
tions the law should follow. Therefore, a comparative lawyer may analyse whether 
                                                 
49
 See e.g. D. C. Esty and D. Geradin (eds), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (Ox-
ford: OUP, 2001); D. D. Murphy, The Structure of Regulatory Competition (Oxford: OUP, 2004); 
Siems, above n 32 at 297-335. 
50
 K. H. Ladeur, „Methodology and European Law – Can Methodology Change so as to Cope with the 
Multiplicity of the Law?‟ (M. Van Hoecke ed., Epistemology and Method of Comparative Law, Ox-
ford: Hart, 2004) 91 at 95-6. 
51
 See e.g. C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and 
Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2006); N. Bernard, Multi-level Governance in the European Union 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002); I. Pernice, „Multilevel Constiutionalism in the European 
Union‟ (2002) 27 European Law Review 511-529. 
52
 The latter are today often called „governance‟. For this term see e.g. R. Rhodes, Understanding Gov-
ernance (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997). 
53
 See e.g. R. La Porta et al., „What Works in Securities Laws?‟ (2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1-32. See 
also M. M. Siems, „What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et 
al.‟s Methodology‟ (2005) International Company and Commercial Law Review 300-305. 
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differences between legal systems confirm that there are varieties of capitalism.
54
 It 
can also be discussed whether and how even in times of „globalisation‟ the law can 
ensure that public goods, such as a stable, fair world financial system, a minimum of 
social justice and an intact environment, are respected.
55
 
Sixthly, an analysis of „law and reality‟ is either interested in the factual reasons 
why law exists or in the factual consequences of the law. The first part of this ap-
proach may discuss how judges actually decide cases. US research has often found 
that judges may compose their judgment in a formal way of deduction but in sub-
stance they mainly pursue policy objectives.
56
 In the UK empirical research has more 
generally analysed the incidence of justiciable problems, the response of the public to 
these problems, the barriers to access to justice and the outcome of different strategies 
for resolving justiciable disputes.
57
 The second part, about the consequences of the 
law, is possibly even more contentious. Here, one may come to the conclusion that in 
a particular society law may exist but does not play any role because moral or cultural 
values oppose a legalistic thinking or law enforcement is weak. But in other cases too 
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 See e.g. I. Lynch Fannon, Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism (Oxford: Hart, 2003). See also 
M. Albert, Capitalism contre Capitalism (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991). 
55
 See e.g. D. Kennedy, „New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Gov-
ernance‟ (1997) Utah L. Rev. 545-637; Zwischenbericht der Enquête-Kommission Globalisierung der 
Weltwirtschaft – Herausforderungen und Antworten (2001), BT-Drucks. 14/6910 at 7. 
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 See e.g. B. N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1921) at 98 („The Judge as a Legislator‟); Jerome Frank, „Are Judges Human?‟ (1931) 80 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 17-53; J. Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). See also W. Rum-
ble, American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process (Ithaka: Cornell University 
Press, 1968); Alex Kozinski, „What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Mak-
ing‟ (1993) 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 993-999. 
57
 Dame H. Genn, Paths to Justice (Oxford: Hart, 1999). See also Genn et al, above n. 4. For an inter-
national comparison see also M. Cappelletti and B. G. Garth (eds.), Florence Access to Justice Project 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Volumes 1-4, 1978-1981). 
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law may not necessarily matter. The reason for this fact is that, if there is causality 
between law and reality, it can also go the other way. For instance, there are examples 
which show that only after the number of investors and the importance of the capital 
market increased was shareholder protection strengthened.
58
 Finally, one can examine 
whether in any case there are simple causalities because a linear, causal relationship 
between law and reality could overlook that legal systems have their own internal dy-
namics of self-reproduction.
59
 
 
4. ‘Scientific legal research’ 
 
Most traditional legal scholarship is similar to hermeneutics because it attempts to un-
derstand what law-makers meant by a specific legal provision and what judges meant 
by a specific court decision. This can also be seen in the previous two parts of this ar-
ticle because examples of micro- and macro-legal research try to understand a particu-
lar or general legal phenomenon. Many other academics would regard this approach 
as „unscientific‟, because science is said to be about constructing models and testing 
falsifiable hypotheses.
60
 In chemistry, as an example for natural sciences, one may 
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For a good overview of the term „science‟ see David Goodstein, „How Science Works‟ in Federal Judi-
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establish the theory that the mixing of three particular substances leads to an explo-
sion. This can be tested empirically in an experiment. If the explosion does not take 
place, the theory is falsified.
61
  
To be sure, the concept of falsifiability is not uncontroversial. Thomas Kuhn and 
others have suggested that in reality the logic of science is different. Scientists do not 
follow a strict concept of falsifiability. Sociological factors and the use of ad-hoc hy-
potheses also play a (fruitful) role in modifying the „prevailing paradigm‟.62 Paul Fey-
erabend goes further and suggests that „anything goes‟ because science can progress 
best if all available methods are used.
63
 Further, there are specific lines of criticism 
that hold that falsifiability is not a useful criterion in all scientific areas. With respect 
to ethics, history and possibly also some parts of economics the problem is that state-
ments related to values as well as grand theories are by their very nature often impos-
sible to falsify.
64
 Even in natural sciences there may be situations where the entire fo-
cus is on falsification and thus the disregard of confirming evidence does not make 
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sense. For instance, the theory that the sun always rises in the east is indeed plausible 
and not just a purely unscientific regularity.
65
 
Yet, even if one does not use the concept of falsifiability, there is at least the 
broader consensus that science is about testing hypotheses. The hypothesis may be 
formulated in any way. It may be falsifiable or not, and there are many different ways 
to test it. Scientific research is therefore possible about any system of ideas and any 
theory which establishes some kind of rules.
66
 On the one hand, research can concern 
a pure or abstract theory.
67
 Here an ideal type of model is not intended to be descrip-
tive but it can still be „tested‟ to determine whether it is logically sound.68 On the 
other hand, the scientific model can be designed to use empirical data and to be ap-
plied to real-world problems.
69
 In natural sciences experiments may often be con-
ducted in order to test these models. In some social sciences controlled human ex-
periments are also possible.
70
 However, as this is not always the case, real world data 
is often used in order to test hypotheses. This can be done in a quantitative or a quali-
tative way. Particularly in economics quantitative research is generally accepted.
71
 
The econometric methodology has also had a considerable impact on other academic 
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 See Bolan, above n 66 at 2. 
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 See Friedman, above n 61 at 35. 
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Methodologies from Experimental Economics‟ (2002) U. Ill. L. Rev. 921-945. 
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fields.
72
 Qualitative research, by contrast, is about an in-depth examination of the rea-
sons for and context of a particular phenomenon.
73
 Often this may focus on a particu-
lar case.
74
 
Until recently, legal academics have hardly taken part in this scientific methodol-
ogy. It is no surprise that there is no Nobel Prize in „legal science‟.75 Although the 
term „legal science‟ was (and is) occasionally used by traditional legal academics, 
their definition of science only denotes the effort accurately to describe the law which 
can be used to solve legal cases in a deductive way.
76
 This mere description of the law 
is not science in a genuine sense. This is also acknowledged by most academic law-
yers, when it is said that „the lawyers‟ capacity for scholarly work cannot be measured 
by reference to scientific techniques.‟77 Various reasons have been offered as explana-
tions for this reluctance to take part in scientific discussion. First, it may be a result of 
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 D. Feldman, „The Nature of Legal Scholarship‟ (1989) 52 MLR 498-517 at 498. 
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a lack of training, particularly in empirical methods.
78
 Secondly, teaching is often very 
much focussed on preparing students for legal practice. This has the effect that legal 
academics are usually more concerned with an accurate and coherent description of 
the law than with scientific theories about it. Thirdly, the subject matter of legal re-
search may also play a role. Legal research often has a reactive quality because it sees 
its prime purpose as being to address new legal rules or court decisions on an ad hoc 
basis.
79
 As legal research deals with competing values, it may also regard itself unable 
to use the more objective scientific method.
80
 Finally, in contrast to natural and many 
other social sciences, time and national borders matter a lot: „Sun, moon and stars 
shine like centuries ago, and the rose is blossoming like in paradise. (…) However, 
law is different. It is like a wanderer in the desert. (…) Three words changed by the 
law-maker may render entire libraries useless.‟81 Therefore, „to put the issue plainly, 
there is no accepted theory of law that applies to every legal system and to which le-
gal scholars in every country can appeal in explaining the particular institutions or 
rules of their own systems‟.82 
However, in recent decades there has been some development. In particular, this 
was the result of the trend of interdisciplinary research in the US.
83
 First, „law and 
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economics‟ is an example of a scientific approach to law. In a nutshell, its main aim is 
to understand what effect particular legal rules have on overall social welfare.
84
 It 
constructs models of the law that are in principle independent of a particular legal sys-
tem. To be sure, law and economics may also make positive and normative claims. 
„Positive law and economics‟ may find that the judges of a particular country already 
apply economic reasoning without expressly referring to it. „Normative law and eco-
nomics‟ may make policy recommendations to change the law according to the eco-
nomic model.
85
 But despite this link to more traditional approaches to legal research, 
the core innovation of law and economics is that it establishes „abstract theories‟ simi-
lar to the economic (and mathematic) methodology.
86
 Furthermore, law and econom-
ics has gone to further depths recently. For instance, it has incorporated behavioural 
                                                                                                                                            
connected, as in the sciences, with the evaluation of theoretical results‟); R. Coase, Law and Economics 
at Chicago (1993) 36 J. Law & Econ. 239-254 at 254 („Ernest Rutherford said that science is either 
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aspects from psychology
87
 and thus, at least to some extent, responded to the criticism 
that its theories about the law are based on assumptions which are too strong.
88
 
Secondly, experiments can make legal research scientific. This „experimental legal 
research‟ is not widely used but there are a few examples.89 For instance, it has been 
attempted to test the Coase theorem. This theorem states that if there are no transac-
tion costs and information asymmetries, legal rules (in particular the allocation of 
property rights) do not matter because bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome.
90
 
This is difficult to test in reality because there are usually transaction costs and infor-
mation asymmetries.
91
 Thus, controlled experiments can be useful and such experi-
ments have indeed confirmed the Coase theorem.
92
 Other examples concern the likely 
impact of legal rules. It has been examined whether damage caps affect the parties‟ 
behaviour in lawsuits. In experiments it has been demonstrated that the level of the 
damage cap influences the probability of an out-of-court settlement.
93
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Thirdly, more common is the testing of legal theories in a quantitative way. The 
most prominent example is „law and finance‟. This interdisciplinary area of research 
looks at the quantifiable effect that legal rules and their enforcement have on financial 
development, and the resulting effect on economic development. Thus, it asks 
whether specific legal features, such as a particular legal rule or the effectiveness of 
courts, correlate with financial data, such as a country‟s stock market capitalisation.94 
Law and finance is particularly important because the World Bank takes it into ac-
count in order to assess the quality of law and legal institutions.
95
 Methodologically, it 
is line with other disciplines which also use quantitative methods in order to test hy-
potheses.
96
  
This testing by way of calculations in law is not limited to „law and finance‟. It is 
also possible to try to establish whether there is a relationship between legal rules and 
other data. Thus, one may use statistical methods to examine whether: the strength of 
employee protection is a result of differences in politics, economics, or legal origins;
97
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legal formalism influences the duration of law enforcement;
98
 there is a relationship 
between the length of statutes and the number of lawyers;
99
 the death penalty or abor-
tion laws have an effect on the crime rate.
100
 
Yet, in social sciences one also has to face the limitations of this quantitative ap-
proach. For instance, in economics a narrow data-driven approach can be superficial, 
because „the economy is a complicated, dynamic, non-linear, high-dimensional, and 
evolving entity‟,101 the whole of economics is contaminated by value judgments,102 
and uncontrollable factors affect economic data.
103
 The reception of quantitative re-
search in law has sometimes been critical too. One can have general doubts whether it 
is possible to reduce the complexity of legal rules to numbers.
104
 More specifically, 
there have been various studies which have challenged some of the numerical descrip-
tions of the law, which are necessary to make statistical calculations work.
105
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Fourthly, one may therefore prefer an alternative methodology, namely the use of 
case studies, which primarily rely on a qualitative methodology.
106
 There is no uni-
form method how these case studies are conducted. However, structured interviews 
are usually a common element. In his famous study on the role of contract law Stew-
art Macaulay interviewed more than 100 businessmen and lawyers and found, „that 
(1) many business exchanges reflect a high degree of planning about the four catego-
ries – description, contingencies, defective performance and legal sanction – but (2) 
many, if not most, exchanges reflect no planning, or only a minimal amount of it, es-
pecially concerning legal sanctions and the effect of defective performances‟.107 Simi-
larly, Simon Deakin et al carried out 60 in-depth interviews in firms in the UK, Ger-
many, and Italy. They found considerable diversity in the form, duration and sub-
stance of contracts, and linked this empirical data to differences in the extent of con-
tractual default rules in these three countries.
108
 
The result of all this is that there are now at least four different ways of engaging 
in „scientific legal research‟: first, law and economics constructs models of how the 
law behaves. Secondly, experimental legal research can be used to test these and other 
models. Thirdly and fourthly, it is possible to use quantitative methods and case stud-
ies in order to verify or falsify legal theories. Despite this variety of approaches this 
does not mean that all legal questions can be addressed in this „scientific way‟. In par-
ticular, other methods may be preferable for legal interpretation and construction. For 
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instance, it can be argued that the question whether the law should recognise the foe-
tus as a „legal person‟ (and thus prohibit abortion) is purely ethical, and thus not test-
able. Here too, however, „scientific legal research‟ can play a role. For example, the 
impact of legalising abortion has indeed been examined empirically.
109
 Such impact 
assessment can at least supplement more traditional approaches to legal interpretation. 
 
5. ‘Non-legal topics’ 
 
The approaches which have been outlined in the previous parts have in common that 
they use legal questions as a starting point. This is even the case for „scientific legal 
research‟ since it „only‟ incorporates the scientific methodology into legal thinking. 
However, this does not always have to be case. In particular in US law journals one 
can find plenty of articles that start with a general question which is not about the law 
as such.
110
 Law is also considered but it is only one of several elements which are 
brought forward in order to explain a particular extra-legal phenomenon. As a starting 
point law is therefore addressed from an external point of view because the researcher 
is primarily interested in its effects. However, in a second step she may apply an in-
ternal point of view in order to understand the pattern and logic of these legal rules.
111
 
The „non-legal approach‟ has recently become increasingly popular in commercial 
law. For example, it is nowadays quite common that academic company lawyers use 
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the title „corporate governance‟ and analyse many factors – the law being just one of 
them – which determine how a company is governed.112 Another example concerns 
the question of what is necessary to create strong capital markets and dispersed share-
holder ownership. Various legal and institutional preconditions for strong capital mar-
kets can be identified such as effective regulators, prosecutors, and courts, financial 
disclosure, reputational intermediaries, company and insider liability, market trans-
parency, culture and other informal institutions.
113
 With respect to dispersed share-
holder ownership, which is often seen as an indicator for developed capital markets, 
the role of not only company and securities law but also politics, history, and private 
institutions has been intensely discussed in recent years.
114
 
This approach is, however, not limited to commercial questions. For example, it 
can also be analysed which factors contribute to a high crime rate in a particular state 
or country. On the legal level one can examine the strength of law enforcement, the 
existence of the death penalty, the availability of child welfare, and possibly also 
abortion laws.
115
 Outwith law one can consider the impact of education, wealth, in-
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come inequality and the composition of the population with respect to age, sex, ur-
banicity, ethnicity and race.
116
 Another topical „non-legal‟ theme is about the meas-
ures which should be adopted to tackle climate change. With respect to the law, vari-
ous national and international endeavours can be discussed such as regional planning 
regarding transport and housing,
117
 the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto 
Protocol.
118
 But climate change as a natural phenomenon can also be addressed by 
developing technologies that reduce CO2 such as ocean fertilisation activities and 
methods to speed up the ocean carbon cycle.
119
 
The attractiveness of applying these „non-legal‟ approaches to legal research is 
that they provide a comprehensive view of a particular topic. These approaches do not 
fall into the trap of focusing on one piece of the jigsaw only to disregard other impor-
tant and interconnected issues. As the links between law and other factors are often 
less researched than the „law as such‟, it could also be relatively easy to achieve origi-
nal results. However, there is the important hurdle that the legal academic has to ac-
quire some knowledge about other academic fields and also needs to be willing to en-
gage in joint work with colleagues from other disciplines. For academic lawyers who 
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identify themselves more with the legal profession than with their colleagues in other 
departments
120
 this would mean a significant paradigm shift.
121
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article has identified four ways of „being original‟ in legal research: research in 
„micro-‟ and „macro-legal questions‟, „scientific legal research‟ and research in „non-
legal topics‟. Nonetheless, it has tried to maintain an attitude of tolerance in not pro-
moting or discrediting one particular method of legal research.  
Yet, there may still be the fundamental objection that „legal originality‟ should not 
be the major aim of legal scholars. It could be said that „law‟ is primarily a practical 
subject. Thus, anything too deep or scientific could be dismissed because it „produces 
abstract scholarship that has little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete 
issues in a wholly theoretical manner‟.122 Rather it could be that one should cherish 
the practicality of legal research which makes it attractive to judges, lawyers, and 
other practitioners.
123
 
                                                 
120
 Cf. R. A. Posner, „Legal Scholarship Today‟ (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314 at 1315-1326. 
121
 For the concept of paradigms see Kuhn, above n. 62. 
122
 H. T. Edwards, „The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession‟ 
(1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34-78 (criticising „impractical scholars‟ of elite US law schools). See also 
Rhode, above n 2 at 1337 („The “high theory” that carries the greatest prestige for legal scholars is of 
least interest to practitioners.‟). For a related position see also A. T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993) at 165-270. 
123
 For this past perception of legal scholarship in the US see Kissam, above n 7 at 221 („Typically, we 
assume that scholarship should … be useful to practitioners, or at least to appellate advocates and the 
courts.‟); Posner, above n 120 at 1314 („judicial model of legal scholarship‟; legal scholars as a 
„shadow judiciary‟); Ulen, above n 31 at 916 („Twenty years ago, prestige and academic acclaim ac-
crued to those legal scholars whose work had a discernible impact on the bench and bar‟); see also 
Cheffins, above n 79 at 462 („legal scholarship quite often is akin to advocacy‟). 
 29 
This objection would, however, miss the purpose of this article. Legal originality 
does not mean an unworldly approach to legal scholarship. „Nothing is more practical 
than a good theory‟.124 Furthermore, original research can lead to a „breakthrough‟ 
and thus it can be more influential than research which just tries to imitate or antici-
pate legal practice. The conflict is therefore not between „theoretical‟ and „practical‟ 
legal scholarship. The latter may have the advantage of an immediate relevance for 
legal practice but the former can have a greater impact on legal practice in the me-
dium and long- term.
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